More Thinking On The Coming Excitement

From a WRSA reader:

What are the motivations of insurgents? What the motivations of the Counter-insurgents? Has violence become necessary? Why or why not?

It is these questions that guarantees that no two situations will be the same. That’s not to say that lessons cant be learned or that strategies cant be applied with equal or better success, however one shouldn’t forget that they can also be applied with a negative impact to the mission or to the entire campaign. Insurgency and counter insurgency are very fluid. Song and dance. It is a chess game played by the higher in command, and a checkers game played by the ground level soldiers, rebels, police, etc.

Insurgencies are products of the negligence of a Governmental or an otherwise powerful group of people, or perhaps a power vacuum. They are made up of an Underground, Auxiliary, and the Guerrillas. They all work together to accomplish a common goal, most likely the overthrow of a Government or pushing a hostile group out of an area or country.

The underground operates in enemy dominated areas providing intelligence on the enemy, conducting propaganda operations, assassinations, espionage, etc.

The auxiliary is the most important part, and the key to a successful insurgency. They operate like the Underground and mirror each other very closely. The auxiliary will provide shelter, food, medical care, and intelligence for the Guerrillas and the Underground. In this they are highly static. However they have more freedom of movement to gather intelligence, conduct nonviolent movement denying operations, distribute and create propaganda, provide smuggling and supply routes, sabotage, etc. It is for these reasons that the Auxiliary is the most dangerous to the Counter-insurgents. They are the life blood of the insurgency, and thus is the hardest of it to kill.

The Guerrillas are the men who do most of the fighting. They conduct guerilla operations against the enemy in question. These are anything that kills or denies the enemy movement, or destroys the enemies morale. I.E.D.s, hit and run ambushes, snipers, political assassinations are all tools of the Guerrillas, but not limited to them.

A successful insurgency must be able to deploy and use these three arms to attack, disrupt, report on and propagandize the enemy to sway the civilian population. You do this by denying the enemy, disrupting his operations, killing the enemy’s men, destroying his morale, propagandizing his mistakes and your successes, and making the enemy incompetent (or appear so.) The Insurgency’s strongest and most important weapon is its Auxiliary, while the enemy’s is his ability to dominate the physical area. The civilian population is, for the most part, the focus of both sides. It can help both sides tremendously, or cripple them.

However, what the Insurgency does, the Counter-Insurgents must do better. If an insurgency is trying to deny the Counter-Insurgents movement, supplies or information, the CI must do it. Failure to do so makes the CI look incompetent, and thus is a political and strategic victory for the insurgency. On the other hand, the CI’s ability to deny the insurgents will make the insurgency look incompetent and force them into the open. Regardless, once the victory in question has been achieved, the victor then propagandizes it and sways the local population. For example, the Tet Offensive in 1968 during the Vietnam war was a military success for the US, and a political defeat. The “insurgents” took advantage of the US media and swayed the US population with coordinated attacks on US and South Vietnamese targets. To many the US military appeared incompetent, and news footage of dead countrymen greatly exaggerated this. While the contrary is true, this swayed the US population to want to end the war. North Vietnam won in the end.

The Counterinsurgent’s job is the hardest to achieve. He must enter an area that is most likely hostile to him, then change the local populace’s opinion of him and the insurgents, then create a local Governmental force that he must temporarily control, and finally continue all manner of operation until the insurgents disappear, give up or are forced into the open and destroyed. Meanwhile the insurgency is propagandizing his every move, killing/attacking him, denying him, infiltrating him and feeding him false information. Think of it like going to a new high school, where you must make friends with most of the school, while constantly getting bullied and beat up, having rumors started about you by a group of people that most of the school likes or loves.

The Counter-Insurgents must put the well being of the local population as the number one objective. They must convince the locals they are the winning side, they can provide protection and the local populations best interest is served in co-operating with them. The insurgents must do this also. The CI must run a network of intelligence 24 hours a day. It will focus of insurgency members who plan, facilitate and operate.

The CI must also never kill an insurgency member unless they have to, which they will use to further convince the locals that they are more competent. Victories with little if any violence will play into CI hands by making them appear competent and protective, especially so because they do not need to use violence. They also avoid making more insurgents this way.

The CI must cut off the insurgents from the population, and to do so nonviolently eliminates a vast majority of strain than a violent, enemy-centric strategy would create. The successful CI use the local population to hardwire the insurgency out. The locals force the insurgents out into the open, or forces them to disappear.

To do all this, the CI must understand the civilian population, its culture, customs, history, etc. From this comes the first stage of drawing up a clear mission statement and a strategy: the post conflict power structure. A people with a history of oppressive governments will be liberated, set up to run their own government which will guarantee them peaceful existence. What state is there to build? How compatible are we to the local population, and thus the Government we will create and interact with? What states have proven effective and viable, and are compatible with the locals? Is there any evidence this will work? These are questions that must be asked as well, because they will help form the CI’s mission statement and goals. Once this is cemented and a clear, concise goal is created, the CI must prepare for the task ahead. On the Insurgents part he must know the enemy and his strategies to overcome and defeat them.

David Kilcullen, who wrote “Counterinsurgency“, created what are known as the “28 Articles of Counter-Insurgency”.

Here is a brief overview:

1.) Know the Turf- People, topography, economy, history, religion, culture. Become an expert on the area. Know every road, field, population group, leader and grudge.
2.) Diagnose the Problem- Who are the insurgents? What is driving them to do the things they do? What makes their leaders? How do you mobilize the Locals to your cause? Do they have motivations? The CI must discuss with their men, and trust them.
3.) Organize for Intelligence- The CI intelligence will mostly come from operations, and the operations will drive the intelligence. For this reason an intelligence section must be organized, and linguists necessary. The CI smartest men will be in the intelligence section.
4.) Organize for inter-agency co-operation- The CI men must be trained for this. The local population will most likely be scared of gear and guns, so it must be learned how not to scare them.
5.) Travel light and harden your combat support service- The insurgents will be traveling and fighting light, so a culture of the same must be enforced on the CI’s men. Speed and mobility. Make sure that the CI can reach back and call for support. The CSS may do more fighting than the patrols, so it is imperative to train them equally.
6.) Find a political adviser- The CI must find a political and cultural adviser from the local population whose mission will be to help shape the enviroment.
7.) Train the squad leaders and trust them- Counter-insurgency is a squad level war, and whoever can bring combat power to bare first will win. The CI squad leaders must be trained to act intelligently. Focus on marksmanship, patrolling, security and basic drills. SL who fail will be replaced.
8.) Rank is nothing, Talent is everything- Any of the CI men who are naturals at Counter-Insurgency will be put in important positions.
9.) Have a game plan- Develop a mental picture of how you want it to play out. For example: “Establish dominance, build local networks, and marginalize the enemy.” Make sure to have easy transitions between phases, in case of setbacks.
10.) Be there- Establish your presence first and foremost. Live in close proximity to the local population. The CI must be seen as real people that can be trusted.
11.) Avoid knee jerk responses- Get facts first. Violence isnt guaranteed to be insurgent activity. The CI will be goaded into making mistakes.
12.) Prepare for a handover- There is a possibility that the Insurgency will not be solved in one tour. When a CI’s tour ends, all intelligence must be organized and distributed.
13.) Build trusted networks- Hearts and minds, the locals best interest is with the CI, and that the CI can protect them.
14.) Start easy- The CI mustn’t go straight for the Insurgents throat. Provoke a showdown or focus on the local population. Start from secure areas and work your way outward.
15.) Seek early victories- Show dominance early, and win any type of victory.
16.) Practice deterrent patrols- The CI will flood an area with numerous small patrols that co-operate. Deploy Blue-Green patrols: Humanitarian patrols in the day and hunt the enemy at night. One to Two thirds of the CI men should be patrolling at all times
17.) Prepare for setbacks- The CI mustn’t lose heart when/if mistakes are made and failures occur. Local commanders must be given lee-way to adjust to things.
18.) Remember the global audience- The CI will create and control good relationships with media
19.) Engage the women, fear the children- Women will be targeted through social ad economic programs, the women must be won. Children will be avoided, they are a propaganda risk for the insurgents.
20.) Take stock regularly- The CI will develop social, informational, military and economic metrics regularly. This will show indications of success or failure over time.
21.) Exploit a single narrative- In the competition to mobilize public support, a single narrative must be created. This is a simply told story or expression that explains the people. For example: Use a nationalist viewpoint to expel foreign insurgents.
22.) Local forces should mirror the enemy- The CI will be working closely with local forces, and they should be equipped, move and organize like the insurgents with the CI’s supports.
23.) Practice armed civil affairs- The CI must focus on meeting the local populations basic needs, while maintaining and updating area surveys. Surveys help to identify the local’s needs.
24.) Small is beautiful- Local populace programs must be small, this way they are cheap, lowkey and sustainable. The CI can add new programs at will.
25.) Fight the insurgents strategy- Insurgents often go on the offensive, going in for the kill rarely helps the CI. The CI will fight the strategy instead.
26.) Build the solution- Stay focused, the CI will not react on the desire to kill and insurgent. Defection > Surrender > Capture > Kill. The CI can the propagandize this.
27.) Keep extraction secret- The insurgents and local population will know when the CI will be leaving, the CI will keep specifics under wraps. The insurgents will use this as an opportunity to win public support back.
28.) Maintain the initiative- If the insurgents are reacting to the CI, the CI has the initiative, and vice-versa.

As I said at the beginning, insurgency and counter insurgency is fluid. It is an information and propaganda war, and strategies will be molded per the situation.

Related introductory material here.


Janet Napolitano’s Latrine Attendant Sends

Screen Shot 2014-04-23 at 10.09.02 PM
Insiders come in all shapes and sizes.


A Partisan Perspective On Bunkerville: Who Wants Victory More?


From a WRSA reader:


It was the nature of partisan resistance that operations against it must either eliminate it altogether or leave it potentially stronger than before. This had been shown by the sequel to each of the previous five offensives from which, one after another, the partisan brigades and divisions had emerged stronger in experience and armament than they had been before, with the backing of a population which had come to see no alternative to resistance but death, imprisonment, or starvation. There could be no half-measures; the Germans left nothing behind them but a trail of ruin. What in other circumstances might possibly have remained the purely ideological war that reactionaries abroad said it was (and German propaganda did their utmost to support them) became a war for national preservation. So clear was this that no room was left for provincialism; Serbs and Croats and Slovenes, Macedonians, Bosnians, Christian and Moslem, Orthdox and Catholic, sank their differences in the sheer desperation of striving to remain alive.[42]

—Basil Davidson

- It was the nature of partisan resistance that operations against it must either eliminate it altogether or leave it potentially stronger than before.

The lesson for the tyrant is that if you’re going to kill off your enemies, you’d better get them all. The ones you miss will only become stronger as a result. Worse, those survivors will see to it that resistance increases in quality and quantity.

- …a population which had come to see no alternative to resistance but death, imprisonment, or starvation. There could be no half-measures…

The lesson for the free man is that he must welcome the tyrant to give it his best shot. In fact, we beg him to do so. Please, show up at the Texas-Oklahoma border for another BLM land grab. Please, erect more barrycades at national forests during sequester time. Please, try to grab for amnesty. Please, try to grab for the guns. The harder, faster, and farther the tyrant stretches out his arm, the more obvious his overreach and the easier he makes the job of creating resistance. The tyrant isn’t dissuaded from tyranny by reason, he desists from tyranny by resistance which only makes itself known after the tyrant makes the first move.


Once the tyrant makes clear his means and intentions, then he and his actions become the PR campaign for the resistance. Who needs to spend time coming up with banners when the tyrant is making them for you. (Barrycades anyone?)

- So clear was this that no room was left for provincialism; Serbs and Croats and Slovenes, Macedonians, Bosnians, Christian and Moslem, Orthdox and Catholic, sank their differences in the sheer desperation of striving to remain alive.

Ebony, Ivory, living in perfect harmony!!!

When the far corners of the CW2 cube come together to fight tyranny, it’s obviously not good news for the tyrant. Those corners will then come together in ways that can’t be easily and neatly modeled by a simple cube. Instead, it might be like a wormhole or secret passage in an old mansion. Or maybe like 4/19/1775 when the British army fought citizens at the North Bridge, but found out the hard way that they had unfriendly forces on all sides. Swarm.

Total tyranny produces total resistance. Total tyranny means that divide and conquer is out the window.

When that happens, it’s just a matter of willpower and desire.

Who wants victory more?

Some final observations:

The key right now is not who doesn’t show up, but the actions of those who DO show up.

Tossing Barrycades for example. Balls.


That Eric Parker guy. Balls.


That might be the “tank man” image of the whole Bundy Ranch standoff a couple of weeks ago.


We the people advance on the BLM gates. The BLM hide behind their vehicles with the gun drawn. When they do, people like Parker took up station to return fire. BLM realizes there are lot more targets than they were counting on and backs down.

By the way, the police state likes to have numerical advantage. I wonder what the standard officer safety ratio is for officers vs. perp? 5:1? 10:1? The BLM brought enough guys to run the Bundy family out. They did not count on being outnumbered-and certainly not outgunned by those who outnumbered them.

Had shit gotten frisky, then it would have been Waco all over again. The Feds can never accept defeat so they would have swarmed resources in there like a thousand Agent Smiths’ in The Matrix Reloaded. Whatever it took to establish federal control and “victory”.



Suggestions From A Reader

What if law-abiding citizens everywhere located BLM local offices, in each state, and BLM accidentally had tire problems?

It would be small, it would not draw much attention, it would make all non Vegas BLM management wish they never heard of Vegas or the Bundy’s, it would deplete BLM budgets everywhere, BLM non hqs agency mgmt support would drop to the floor, there would be no focal point, and the press would not point fingers because it would not be a lead story. Anyone who did go out of the way to report it would give themselves up as a democrat shill, etc.

Regarding the force continuum-

The more training a person has, the greater the number of tools in the tool box available to get things done, the longer and broader the force continuum. The more highly trained a person is with a weapon, the more likely he/she is to find another way of settling things or accomplishing the mission without using a weapon. If you reduce the training down to where the force continuum is comprised of scream and shoot (many recent web examples) then you should orchestrate things so that the Walter Mittys of the BLM trip their own wire, at the wrong time, and hang themselves with their own rope.

Like shooting bulls for the fun of it.

BLM look alikes could wear t-shirts that say things like

- “I’m BLM and I’ll kick your ass, and your cow’s ass, too!”,
- “I’m from BLM and I’m here to help”,
- “Tree huggers and desert tortoises love BLM”,
- “BLM, the only fed agency you’ll ever need”, and
- “BLM, your one stop shop for counter-patriot extermination”.

They only need to wear the shirts once, but at a location with drive by media filming, and where BLM are present or abundant. If everyone wore theirs in Vegas the morning of the next raid, the press will be present, and the raiders will be hitting all the food joints about 3am before going to the suit up sight. No rat likes a bright light! Help them make themselves look bad!

Psyops with no actual crime.

The lack of scope of their force continuum shows that their mgmt team could care less about the “industry standard” for training for law enforcement. And it is their mgmt team that should be held responsible for it. The National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) sets the standards for all law enforcement in the US. If a department or agency goes to court and is shown not to be up to industry standard, it’s an instant loss. Or as in the case of several fed agencies, they don’t even try to back an agent’s legal correctness, they just settle out of court.

You know that BLM will leave a mess, if the law abiding citizens were shown on tv to be constantly cleaning up after BLM, it would carry weight. Also, BLM will need a large suiting up/staging area. So if they are going to do it all wrong, they will probably use the race track parking lot. Have watchers keep an eye on likely sites and report.

Bundyville Briefs

In the Hearts of Patriots

Reid Putting Peace of Republic in Extreme Peril

“If you will drop me an email if you have anything you wish to donate, I will see that it gets matched up with needs on the ground, transportation assets to move it there, etc.”

Meet The Militia Rushing To Cliven Bundy’s Defense

From Bunker Hill To Bunkerville – Americans Fight Back!

Just Do It

From a WRSA reader.

Quote Of The Week

“Who’s talking to the BLM mechanic out there in Nevada? How about their dry cleaner? And where they get their doughnuts?”

– WRSA Reader



DIY Weapons In Syria – The Hell Cannon

Name: Hell
Function: Explosive barrel Cannon
Specifications:It can fire more than fifteen types of shells that weigh more than forty kilograms. It also has two locally-made rocket launchers (Rohingya)
Range: 1.5 kilometers
Effectiveness: Up to 200 square meters
Projectile: Propane gas cylinder
Cost of the shell: 15000 Syrian Pounds
Country of Origin: Syria
Manufacture: Ahrar Al-Shamal Battalions

See also

10 Improvised Weapons Made By Syrian Rebels


Mosby: Tactical Intelligence Considerations (With Relevance To Bunkerville)

Protesters gather at the Bureau of Land Management's base camp near Bunkerville, Nevada
Detailed, pungent, useful commentary.


Mosby: New Kids On The Block

From John Mosby:

One of the complaints I often hear via email is the cost involved in traveling to training. Training itself, whether with me, Max V, Mason-Dixon, or any of a variety of other trainers, is not particularly expensive. Getting TO that training CAN be though. With trainers working all along the eastern seaboard, and throughout the midwest, as well as here in the mountain northwest, one of the shortcomings in training has been the southwest. I’ve done a few classes there, and will continue to do so in the future, but it’s not a place I go regularly (or at all in summer!).

Fortunately, there’s a new kid on the block ready to step in and do their part. Sierra12 ( is run by a couple of combat arm vets from the Army and Marine Corps who have been in a couple of classes with me, and know what they are doing. They’ve helped AI classes, and generally can be trusted to know what the fuck they are talking about in the context of their classes.

Most important of all, since they conduct at least some of their training on the same place I do training in Arizona, and I’ve had discussions about them with the land owner, I can attest that they won’t rape your cattle, steal your women, or show you a bunch of stupid bullshit that will get your ass killed earlier than fate decrees.

Perhaps most important of all, while I was doing important shit like taking classes for work, they were actually doing what they believe in and standing on the line in Nevada. Support their efforts.

If you’re in the SW, check them out.



ZH: Police Killed In China For Malpractice


Who knew?

Mess with people enough, and they fight back.

With only rocks, if necessary.

Good to know.


Guerrillamerica: Threat Characteristics and TO&E


If you don’t know the answers to these questions in your AO, you are in trouble:

What is the strength and disposition of ALL regime forces in the Area of Operations (AO)?

How are they organized?

What equipment do they have?

Bonus: Anyone with a brain can and should be a collector.

Injuries or infirmities do not disqualify.



From over the transom:

There are three ways to win a battle:

Head to head - the most expensive and dangerous way.
Head to head – but taking the bad guys head out of the fight. Psyops, disinfo ops, pbs, etc.
Forfeit – making it so the bad guys can’t show up. Photo and publish photos of all involved LE. Photo and publish photos of all their license plates and vehicles possible.

Sidewall punctures of tires. Run the bad guys costs way up; eliminate their mobility – at worst, get charged with malicious mischief.

And most importantly, “own” the language, grammar, and terms used. Identify the politicians and BLM as the bad guys. Do not use a single term, word, label, or definition currently used by the useful idiots at BLM.

Remove the word “militia” from use and replace with “law-abiding citizens”.

Day By Day

From Chris Muir.

Buppert: Question Obedience, Not Authority


You ultimately control the game.

Withdraw consent.

lg By any means

Guerrillamerica: OPSEC Class This Wednesday

Sam has the details at his place.

Be there if you can.

The Emotions Of Socialism

If you do not yet understand that freedom-loving people are engaged in a religious war with the Collectivists, this GoV piece will help.

There is no compromise with religious fanatics.

There is isolation (which has failed due to their successful Long March).

There is victory.

And there is defeat.

Choose wisely.

The Admixture Of Military And Law Enforcement

Herschel posts an important article on Regime force synthesis.

Related thoughts from Sam K. and this LRC piece.

And if anyone in FREEFOR thinks they will be able to operate successfully against these threats without a robust Intel function, they are kidding themselves.

Good news?

Tactics (such as evidence collection, intel-based targeting, and personnel duty syntheses) work both ways.

Comms, The Feds, & Next Time

TL raises the issue.

The Bad People will be interdicting communications from the next hotspot – count on it.

NightWatcher sends:


In regard to a communication protocol for events such as Bunkerville, I dug up some old pictures I remember from Waco. Our communication system is only slightly better than that practiced by the Branch Davidians.

We can do far better than this.

Please refer your readers to the AmRRON/TAPRN (American Redoubt RadioNetwork/The American Preparedness Network) website to help this program along:

Pictures attached.

Tempus fugit.


Sparks31: Request For Info/Want More Classes?

Sparks31 is willing to add more dates, but needs space.

Can you help?

Ping him at his place.


JC Dodge: Holsters – A Subjective Analysis of the Waist Mounted Handgun Conveyance

Read and learn.

Share your holster learning experiences in comments.

TL Davis: A Terrorist Government

TL provides more proof that “FUSA” (former United States of America) is the correct term these days.

Alea iacta est.


Visual Resistance

From various places – enjoy!




harry reids world

Zoomie: For That Asshole Harry Reid – Pan Fried Rebellion

Copy of proud domestic terrorist
More at his place.


$10 DIY Alarm System That Calls Your Cellphone

Excellent cost/benefit ratio.

American ingenuity.

It’s what will win this war.