>Read and think through this essay from Gates of Vienna:
Note from GoV editor:
El Inglés returns to the topic of a possible culturally enriched civil war in the UK during the not-so-distant future, and speculates about some of the characteristics and constraints that are likely to apply to such a conflict.
Reflections on the Civil War in Britain
by El Inglés
Given the obvious and apparently unalterable trajectory that Britain is charting towards violent conflict between the historic British people and our Muslim fifth column, it might be interesting to indulge in a little harmless futurology with respect to the likely characteristics of this conflict. The idle speculation that makes up the content of this essay is hereby offered up by a playful mind with, perhaps, too little to gainfully occupy it.
If the historic British people (hereafter referred to as HBP) and the Muslim fifth column (hereafter referred to as MFC) contaminating their country ever do descend into a Troubles-style conflict writ large across the whole of the United Kingdom, it is certain that the conflict will be highly asymmetric in nature. I do not imply by this that it will be a particularly close parallel of any classic asymmetric conflict, such as those in Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Malaya. Rather, I imply simply that the characteristics, strengths, weaknesses, and geographical dispositions of the two sides are so different as to preclude the possibility of them bringing to bear on each other the same types of violence with the same objectives. This point will become clearer as we proceed through the essay.
In the interests of imposing order on a subject matter that lends itself to disorderly rambling, I will organize this essay thematically. Each section will pick a specific theme and consider, as seems appropriate, the relative advantages and disadvantages of HBP and MFC in each regard.
The UK currently has a Muslim population of approximately 2.4 million. Let us assume, conservatively, that 5% of this population is supportive of terrorist attacks against the British state and people by believers residing within it. This equates to 120,000 people who might be prepared to support, more or less directly, an attack of this sort.
In comparison, the UK has a total population of 61 million people, of whom approximately 90%, or 54.9 million, can be considered white British. If a mere 1% of these people were to be supportive of terrorist attacks of some sort on the Muslim population of the UK, then we would already have some 549,000 white Britons in this category. A brief ‘exchange’ of terrorist actions between these two subsets of their relative populations would undoubtedly polarize the political situation, increasing the size of both terrorism-supporting groups, to an extent not amenable to being solved by any purely political means at all. As and when such natives minorities emerge and start to occupy themselves with their political agendas, we will be in a hard game indeed.
MI5, the British domestic security service, has repeatedly claimed to be stretched to the limit by the very real threat of Muslim terrorism. One is reluctant to believe everything people in such services say in public statements, but it does seem to be the case that the reason Mohammed Siddique Khan, ringleader of the 7/7 London bombers, was not put under continued surveillance was that there were simply not sufficient resources to do so, despite existing concerns about him. Given the massive growth in the Muslim terrorist threat in the UK in the last few years, and given further that any branch of government will be afforded resources roughly commensurate to the tasks it must undertake, it seems likely that MI5 will indeed have been struggling to make its budget cover the rapidly emerging Islamic threat.
Of course, budgets can be increased. But organizations cannot be usefully or speedily expanded simply by throwing money at them. An organization like MI5 must grow organically, screening and training new staff and incorporating them into its operational structure. Accordingly, the rate at which it can grow will be limited quite irrespective of the financial limitations imposed upon it.
Now imagine a state of affairs in which 549,000 people, amongst a population a hundred times as large, support in some fashion the use of violence by non-state actors against the UK Muslim population or some part thereof, and some smaller subset become involved in actively planning and attempting to carry out such attacks. Such a development would instantly dwarf the ability of MI5 and Special Branch to keep track of even a small fraction of the terrorist violence being plotted throughout the entire country, and this would be true as long as the conflict raged, as there is no conceivable way that these services could increase their capacity by a factor of, say, 50, to keep up with an entirely plausible (indeed, laughably conservative) 50-fold rise in the amount of tribal violence between MFC and HBP.
This is, apart from size, arguably the single greatest asymmetry in the looming conflict. MFC is overwhelmingly concentrated in urban areas, most obviously London, the West Midlands, and the North of England. HBP on the other hand, have, unsurprisingly, a strong presence throughout the entire country, and are the only occupants of rural Britain to all intents and purposes. This situation has many and varied implications. I will discuss them mainly from the Muslim point of view, HBP’s advantages and disadvantages being implicit in the reverse position.
– – – – – – – – –
1. The urban concentration of Muslims gives them a high chance of being able to obtain some sort of local dominance in key areas. How long this dominance lasts is another question, but it is probable that certain areas will hemorrhage non-Muslims fairly rapidly.
2. The urban concentration of Muslims and the consequent urban nature of the battlefield (no Muslims, no battle) gives Muslim an advantage of sorts in that their ‘forces’ are all close at hand and their lines of communication short. In any serious breakdown of civil order, however, during which it becomes dangerous to be identified as the enemy outside one’s own territory, this will effectively trap Muslims in small urban enclaves from which they cannot easily escape, with all accompanying psychological and logistical pressures.
3. At least in its early stages, the conflict will still be at least somewhat amenable to being constrained by regular law enforcement activities. Urban areas are so saturated with CCTV cameras and will have such a short police response time that great risks will be taken by those who engage in paramilitary activity in these areas at first, be they Muslim or British.
4. The urban concentration of Muslims and the drastically reduced general mobility they will suffer when things start to get ‘hot’ will be a huge disadvantage. Curfews; house-to-house sweeps looking for weapons, explosives, and wanted individuals; aerial surveillance; all of these things will be much easier for the apparatus of state to perform on Muslims than on their opponents, who will be a) naturally dominant in more rural areas and b) able to move around there with little suspicion. Only very rarely does one encounter a cultural enricher whilst strolling England’s leafy pathways, and their sudden presence there will not go unresponded to in the event of unpleasantness between them and the British, by state or non-state actors.
5. Muslim enclaves cannot be considered self-sufficient in any way, shape, or form. Food, water, medical supplies, and power must all be provided, albeit in different ways, from outside. Any or all of these supply routes can, in principle, be cut. Rubbish collection can be disrupted; mobile phone masts can be shut down or signals jammed; phone lines can be cut. All Muslim areas will be subject to these pressures should conflict break out; British areas will not be subject to them at all except insofar as they are adjacent to Muslims areas. Furthermore, the technical expertise required to build and maintain infrastructure of this sort lies overwhelmingly in the hands of the British.
6. A significant majority of the land mass of the United Kingdom has virtually no Muslims in it at all. This will provide the British with a huge area of operations in which to train, drill, experiment with firearms and explosives, and also with plentiful opportunities to meet and plan in areas where both technical and physical surveillance on the part of the police/security services are hard to conduct.
7. Muslim enclaves are likely to expand, or at least consolidate, as ethno-religious cleansing forces both Muslims and British to retreat from certain areas in favour of others. This will simplify the situation for all actors and entrench the psychological divide.
People in Positions of Power
MFC has, thankfully, relatively low concentrations of people in professions which would provide privileged access of the sort that would be useful to would-be terrorists. Policemen, politicians, military personnel, civil servants, and the like: any such figure in a position to aid and abet any sort of terrorist organization would be worth his weight in gold to it.
Such figures are, of course, to be found overwhelmingly among HBP, and will likely prove to be recruitment targets for any underground organization which finds itself to be sufficiently underwhelmed by MFC to decide to try and attack it in some fashion. Even something as straightforward as an illicit flow of reliable intelligence as to the whereabouts and/or routines or potential targets in the Muslim community would massively increase the effectiveness of such organizations, for whom intelligence-gathering will be difficult due to the tribal nature of the conflict and the difficulties of infiltrating enemy groups.
The degree of intellectual and ideological corruption that swathes of our apparatus of state now labour under notwithstanding, there must still be high concentrations of people in the military, the police, and the civil service who are appalled at what the cancer of Islam is doing to their country, and who will eventually end up being well-disposed to those who would strike back against Islam on British soil. This will become all the truer if Muslims target the police or military on British soil, which they have already tried to do and will almost certainly try to do again in the event of serious conflict. The collusion of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the British Army in at least some loyalist paramilitary attacks on republican targets during the Troubles is well known (though the scope of such collusion is still controversial).
Dispositions/Sympathies of Police, Military, and Ex-Military
Following on from the previous section, the British police are, for reasons I will not pretend to understand, perpetually trying to increase the representation of ethnic minorities within the force. Thankfully, these efforts seem to be doomed to failure, with all minorities remaining underrepresented. This is a huge blessing for those of us concerned about the shape of things to come. Irrespective of the degree of corruption the police manifest as an institution due to the political pressures already being placed on them, they will remain overwhelmingly white, and of working class and lower middle-class background. Their sympathies can therefore be expected to remain with HBP, and the degree of contempt and disgust the British bobby feels for MFC can only be expected to increase.
As with the police, so with the military. Muslims are massively underrepresented in the British military, with this too being a situation that the idiots at the Ministry of Defence are trying to ‘remedy’, with a similar degree of success. Trying to predict in any detail the likely deployments or attitudes of the military in the event of a serious breakdown of civil order between MFC and HBP is beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say for the moment that it is highly unlikely that the rank and file of the military, having spent the last several years fighting Muslims across the world, will feel much sympathy for MFC. Nor can they be expected to be well-disposed to the idea of shooting their fellow white Britons to enhance the security of Muslims. Whether or not the officer class would be likely to pass along orders from their civilian superiors to engage in such shooting is a question I will have to leave to others to answer. Personally, I consider it unlikely. Forcing one’s troops to disobey one’s orders by ordering them to shoot their own people in their own country is an activity that no right-minded officer is likely to engage in.
Lastly, there is the question of the likely activities of ex-military personnel during conflict between HBP and MFC. At the risk of stating the obvious, it seems improbable that such folk would sit around watching the growing disorder on the television when they could be ‘contributing’ to it themselves. No longer constrained by chain of command, quite possibly full of hostility towards Muslims, certainly missing the smell of cordite in their new 9-to-5 office jobs where ‘combat’ consists of firing elastic bands at people, and with old military networks and know-how still in place, ex-military personnel are likely to flood into any organizations promising a chance to stick it to the believers on the shores of Albion itself. And there will be tens of thousands of them, many of them, one would imagine, in the police. If those in government tasked with considering these matters (as opposed to those tasked with singing the glories of our newfound diversity) are not having sleepless nights over this, then they are not doing their jobs properly…
Read the rest.
Then, using all supplemental materials at the student’s disposal, compare and contrast the coming Restoration of the Republic rumble here in the US of A.
There will be a test.
Audentes fortuna iuvat.