Presented as a thought exercise for educational purposes only by Happy Fun Ball Productions and Remove Garment Before Ironing Industries:
OPERATION AFGHANISTAN 1000X – III% War Game
How We Won : The First and Last Operation of the 2015 III% Revolutions
This narrative recounts how the III% Patriots and III% Militia won Operation Afghanistan 1000X.
Operation Afghanistan 1000X was a war game proposed by the III% Patriots in the course of their blogs and comments. Because so many of those patriots and blogs had the same understanding “They are so very obviously going to lose their financial and physical assets in any shooting war, how can they be so stupid? How can they do this to us?”, the idea arose to demonstrate III% strength, then to do so in a war game with live ammunition but very carefully controlled so there will be, can be, no deaths.
The idea of a war game exercise as a low-cost resolution of the political standoff between the kleptocracy and patriots was first mentioned in a leading patriot blog in mid-December, 2014 and then discussed widely during Christmas’s family gatherings. After a January of online discussions, the blogs had settled on a proposed war game and the name, a reminder that things could get very serious for everyone if a shooting war started. As an alternative to ‘the Samson Option’ sabotage campaign, pulling the system down around everyone’s ears, a bloodless war game made a lot of sense. Deaths, everyone agreed, short-circuited rational calculation of costs and benefits, preventing political resolution of disputes until long after the outcome had been decided. That was in nobody’s interest.
At that point, several different groups began issuing press releases and touting their stewardship of their ‘better version’. Others began development of Massively Multiplayer Online Game (MMOG) war games and the development of weapons, strategy and tactics. A coordinated war game proposal and player-generated game was developed over the next few months for each of the variants of the proposed war game. All had a large number of enthusiastic participants providing data for each.
Major opposition in the patriot camp came from some of the better organized militias, that had trained long and hard for a guerrilla war, and from segments with an economic interest in that approach. However, the advantages were too obvious, and within another month these groups had been convinced and then provided some of the best tactics and operation plans.
Because the III% Militia was not a unified command, rather a bunch of people who own the uniform might decide to wear it on some particular day, the government ultimately settled on the particular version of the war game, the one they thought was most favorable to them.
That live fire exercise became the first operation in what has become known as 5th generation warfare, where everything is planned and coordinated in the open, on the web forums, but executed by individuals and small cells that are entirely unknown to each other. It is now a standard method for resolving very difficult political disputes around he world.
By the end of January, the discussion was serious enough that it began percolating into the 1%’s minds. The potential loss of wealth among the oligarchy if a Samson Option was not avoided made the 1% and minions., all infected with Gruber’s “they are stupid, have always believed our lies, how could we lose?” mindset, to cause every minion editorialist in the country to agree that a war game was a fine idea.
Soon, all agreed that no rational group would choose the possibility of a real Afghanistan 1000X and the deaths and poverty that would imply, that this was a fair test in a contest of political wills, and certainly should decide the issue. Privately, after careful consideration, the 1% without military experience all agreed a bunch of peasants could not affect them beyond mere inconvenience, perhaps a temporary loss of stock price. Of course, they knew how to hedge against that, even make $ from the credulous peasants who might be persuaded to bet against them, given the right editorial leads. So many adopted a hard line, advocated vigorous any-cost defense measures to “put them in their place”.
As there were few in the 1% with military experience or deep knowledge of history, that was a nearly unanimous opinion, widely echoed in the neocon press.
Not that governments had any choice, as the target chosen was US Airports, a list of the 30 top airports, all the international arrivals, etc. Those depend on government security via TSA and backed up by a lot of federal, state and local agencies. They are crucial to commerce, e.g. if FedEx stops backup units don’t get delivered, … The cascade of problems arising from delayed deliveries would be endless, each one pointing out the government’s inability to keep the infrastructure operating.
Patriots announced a time and date for the attack : 10AM on 8 November 2015, 9 months in the future. They agreed to limit attacks to 2 airports, one chosen 1 minute before the hour by the government, another chosen at the same time by the value of a random number mod 30 taken from a public source of random numbers. That source was to be determined, and proved quite contentious.
Patriots defined their goal : Without loss of life by either side, shutting down both airports for 24 hours to demonstrate the depth and breadth of their commitment to a return of Constitutional government and the proposition that no society can withstand a determined assault on its infrastructure by such a group. If the society cannot withstand such an attack, then the political system must act to satisfy that group. Successfully shutting down the airports is such a demonstration. Politically, QED.
Obviously, all of the airports would need to be shut down with personnel moved to safe locations for the duration of the attack. The war game had serious costs for both sides.
This war game obviously gave huge advantages to the government, they could concentrate all their resources protecting these 30 airports. They could do a best-possible job on the airport they chose. As a one-time operation, they would have at least 4X the effective security personnel as would be required for a long-term 24/7/365 effort. Other advantages were that operations can be scheduled so as to not be disrupted and provide the maximum number of people and amount of material to be used to recover from any damage. Patriots, on the other hand, would have to cover all airports with their attacks, as their targets were both chosen at the last minute.
Simultaneously with the discussion and decision of the target, attacks on all the possible targets were discussed, including rail and truck transportation, IRS processing centers, the electrical grid, and irrigation systems. People with insider knowledge began contributing to the discussion, TOR had 10s of 1000s of exit nodes added, far more than all of the intelligence services in the world combined could cope with. Chains of trust were built from people well-known in the Patriot movement to anonymous insiders.
One very popular option was dubbed ‘pitter-patter of lead rain’, in which active III% attackers would shoot at parked airliners during the 1-hour interval. To shut down an airport was easy, according to this discussion thread : all you had to do was damage airplanes and keep dumping crap on the runways. Airplanes can’t take off if there is any possibility of damage, and lead and steel pellets everywhere may well damage engines. By this thread, defenders would have to assume worst-case. Defending an area of completely- cover-your-ass radius from the airport to a completely-cover-your-ass search detail is obviously impossible in a reasonable time at even unreasonable cost. Impossible for even a one-time event.
The ‘lead drops’ thread developed into sub-threads discussing usefulness of different calibers, optimal combinations of attack range for each, effectiveness of indirect fire from maximum distance, CPEs, measuring the precise ballistics of your gun/ammunition combinations, range extensions via saboted rounds in the .50CALs, development and integration of software, what reference landmarks to use for indirect aiming, and, given the target and local temperature/pressure/humidity the number of clicks vertical and horizontal for all known scopes, and training games to develop real skill with the targeting software and setting up the ‘artillery’ location.
As the discussion developed, it became obvious that airports were really soft targets, and that people should not be in them during an attack. This assumption made the attacks easier, as there were a wider range of ways to deliver damage to the total airport if nobody was there to be hurt. Other threads discussed overwhelming any possible defenses by very many cheap and easily-constructed mostly-paper and -plastic battery-powered drones dropping finned steel rods from above-goose-gun heights, attacks of many types on TSA’s defense systems and the Air Traffic Control systems. Suggestions were many and varied, and all recognized they were only working on the obvious and general cases, and many locally-better ideas would be kept secret by individuals intending to use them. Trebuchets and potato cannons of various ranges were a fun alternative, not entirely unrealistic as a means of putting a lot of scrap metal on taxi ways and dents in airframes.
The hacker vector garnered world-wide attention, with many participants who claimed they were part of elite hacker groups in countries less-than-friendly to America. The government media tried to make an issue of this, but the III% response of ‘we didn’t make them mad’ along with “not our day to watch them, we can’t even herd our own cats” denials of responsibility ended that dispute, advantage patriots.
A fully distributed militia has plausible and convincing deniability far exceeding that of even the most incompetent governments.
Communications disruption was coordinated with the hackers, timed for the last 5 minutes of the hour, giving hackers enough time to FUBAR all of the control systems in the airport before all the fiber optics would be cut.
The discussions convinced disinterested observers around the world that this would be an attack in great depth in every vector, putting maximum stress on defenders. At least that would be true if the III% Milita was as strong and effective as claimed.
All agreed that large numbers of fireworks and firecrackers and shooting blanks would begin on the hour at all locations, and continue through the end of the hour. All agreed that every individual would decide on what they could do, and begin acting as through they were going to execute that plan. Whether or not they thought they would do so, acting ‘as if’ was good camouflage for those who fully-intend to ‘do’. Nobody in either group did anything illegal, just the obvious purchase of supplies, building paper and plastic airplanes and practicing their bombing runs, downloading of software, playing training games, reading the online discussions, practicing in the real world, measuring locations everything needed for targeting programs, etc. These made it obvious to the authorities how wide the support and simultaneously impossible for the authorities to follow everything and everybody.
By the end of July, all the required data for the gun-version of ‘lead rain’ had been collected and targeting software integrated with detailed maps giving lat/long/altitude for floors of buildings and windows in them, scope data, calibration procedures and tools at every gun range. The maximum ranges for .50CALs was 3 miles using saboted ammunition. Leaked government estimates were that 1,000,000 sportsman had calibrated rifles of .338 and above. Interest in hunting the biggest game animals appeared to surged amazingly, as sales of rifles and ammunition in all larger calibers was at an all-time high. 100s of 1000s of individuals had downloaded the targeting programs for one or more of the 30 airports and played the MMOG games that used them. New sub-threads were elaborated continuously : one-shot drill-pipe muzzle-loading gunpowder cannons with saboted finned rods as penetrators proved to have a very long range and to be surprisingly, if not very, accurate. Used drill pipe and other high-strength tubes disappeared from inventories before the government could react. Plans for trailers loaded with those cannons to ripple-fire penetrators at buildings with electronics were developed, published, critiqued and revised. Youtube’s many ‘how to add tungsten carbide tips to tools’ videos suddenly became very popular.
Citizens near airports had stockpiled huge amounts of firecrackers and other noise-makers. Sales of 3-d printed components for drone aircraft and purchase of steel rods and fin materials were 10s of tons. Intelligence estimates were ‘enough to carpet the parking areas, not a square meter of airplane undamaged’.
The government had been busy in defense since the Status Quo had decided they could win this game. It had early given up on ’rounding up the leaders’, as the first effort had resulted in 3 masked people, III% Militia by their uniforms in the videos each of them shot of their operation and uploaded to Youtube, walking up to the security fence at a local airport and shooting holes in a parked United airliner – none were caught. That airline was chosen because United’s Chairman had been a staunch advocate of hardball security, even most security minions thought he was extreme and most outsiders assumed he was representing the most aggressive security organizations. Those were, of course, the ones least exposed to immediate blame if patriots succeeded.
After that incident, nothing dramatic happened in August and September. Intense discussions of possible attacks and defenses against them continued. The MMOGs kept evolving to incorporate the weapons used and the MMOGs had more players, and many more very good players. The MMOGs held weekly tournaments for players at all levels. In all of this, many players evolved ‘innocent attacks’ able to divert security operations with completely innocent actions, well scripted and well acted.
Government forces could not keep up, as obvious attacks were widely known to evade any possible defense, reiterated by TSA and other security experts many times in public and private forums during July, September and very often beginning in October. Few people wanted to be anywhere near an airport in the attack hour : estimates were that saboted tungsten penetrators would destroy all electronic equipment outside of fortified bunkers.
The chains of trust allowed last-minute delivery of passwords, configuration and other information to be used by the hacking teams to shut down much of the airport security and ATC electronics during the attacks. Again, this was coordinated in open forums, with TOR access by everyone. It was thought that even without damage, scrubbing those systems before they could be trusted would take several long days. Thus any access and execution of a prepared script would be sufficient to win the engagement.
Mainstream coverage of these events was very sparse until the 1%’s minions were instructed to do so. The week after Labor Day, coverage was incessant, equivalent to that given to the Iranian hostage crisis under Jimmy Carter. Every evening news programs would have a segment relating the days A1000X events. During October, the alarm was extreme, and political reactions driven by fear followed closely.
Political leaders followed their standard playbook for alarming situations, projecting firmness against the ‘domestic terrorists’, while resisting actual police operations to avert the attack. It was clear from the beginning that the government did not have enough police and military to round up enough people quickly enough to prevent serious damage to the economy, and that droning any of them would be really bad PR. Lesser restrictions, on ammunition sales and on-site surveying to establish distances and directions for targeting were judged to be useless, and that it was better to allow them and use the information to assess plans.
Despite great efforts, the National Security Council, military and intelligence leaders could not find a possible winning end-game for any authoritarian action: all would confirm the worst fears of the III% patriots, and would recruit a larger and younger group. The lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq had finally penetrated. Cynics speculated that bearing the costs of the stupid policies here in the US made the difference.
By the end of August, there were far too many people who could plausibly join the attack and far too many openly-discussed attacks to lose the game, no matter what resources the governments and airlines deployed. There were hints of many other attack plans that were not openly discussed, of already-successful hacks that would foil many of the government’s defenses.
Because it was so apparent that the attacks would overwhelm defenses, the TSA changed the person in charge of defense against Operation Afghanistan 1000X every month from July through October. The last appointed, in mid-October, was a noted ‘defensive strategist’, Daniel Thompson, who had been an advisor in several peasant uprisings around the world. Dr. Thompson was a well-published authority in that area and had a very good track record as a ‘global strategist’, by which he meant ‘going broke is losing’. He had been, from the first, a consultant to TSA in planning the response to ‘A1000X’, as TSA had designated it.
Dr. Thompson’s reputation was one of dealing with raw reality and always telling the people hiring him exactly what his very professional opinion dictated. He was convinced to take the job by a very large bonus if he could ‘prevent the government from losing in an A1000X attack’. That phrasing covered the intent, badly, being political shorthand for ‘convince everyone we are going to lose, do it in a way that makes you the lightening rod while we get to be judicious in assigning blame for the terrible state of our security’, and that was just bureaucratese for ‘put a good face on abject surrender’.
As the day approached, III% web sites got a lot of attention, sales of gear soared and their ad revenue funded the next year’s keg parties.
The airlines insurance carriers and legal advisors were first to insist that the companies accept that attacks were going to happen and that the government could not stop them all, or maybe not many, thus liability/liability. Insurance carriers refused to insure any airframe parked at any of the 30 airports during the hour of the attacks. Legal all said the airlines would be liable for injuries to passengers if they delivered them into a target airport. Those restrictions ensured that no flights could be scheduled to leave the airports for about 2 hours prior to A-hour, none to land for the rest of the day in order to be sure the runways had been cleared, computers restarted, … Basically, all 30 airports would be closed the day of the attack. Personnel may as well stay home, and all security personnel would be well protected, invisible. Security videos of empty airports would be good PR for patriots, the governments could not let that happen.
The government, under Dr. Thompson’s direction, very reluctantly gave into the Airlines rescheduling, as otherwise someone would have had to sign to accept the insurance coverage of all involved. No political advisor could see enough upside for their principal to allow them to do that, and all policy analysis said ‘no way, law suits forever’.
Thus, the last day, with very intense coverage of all sides of the event, the news channels running patriot site comment streams live, the President put a good face on the situation. He lauded patriots for their adherence to the Constitution, the civilized way they had demonstrated their commitment to it, and the many ‘activist milita’ members who had ‘seemed to prepare’ for an attack. Voice-over commentary on all the networks, easily tracked as the President was speaking slowly, ponderously, intentionally impressive because he had to pull a nation with him in order to avoid a civil war, all said ‘seemed to prepare’ was probably true. “However,“ the President said, “that large minority and their intensity can no longer be ignored, they and the government failures in public functions they identify must be taken very seriously. Further, a series of local optimizations does not produce a global optima.
Clearly, the government and its relationships with the rest of the society could be improved, as the current system had alienated so many people. It is time to rethink the government. Thus, the government is proposing legislation for a ‘blank slate’, repealing all laws.” As it was unlikely that all parties could agree on a date, his administration had chosen to repeal all laws since the first day of the congress in 1776.
And everyone lived happily ever after…