Civilian Irregular Defense Groups


History, plus possible lessons for a war-torn land filled with ethnic and political irreconcilables.

Questions for deeper consideration via a conflict in FUSA:

1) Who will be the combatants?

2) Who will be the supporting foreign powers?

3) What areas, if any, will serve as sanctuary areas?

4) Of what importance, if any, will be the integrity and professionalism of faction leadership? How will those factors impact the conflict overall?

9 responses to “Civilian Irregular Defense Groups

  1. What angers me is how the Montagnards were caught in a tug-of-war between the SF, ARVN, and MACV and their conflicting agendas.That Westmoreland changed the Montagnards priority to self defense and intel gathering to become mere conventional cannon fodder to go on the offense against the VC demonstrates the callousness of the US government to use allies as expendable pawns. And what was the Montagnard’s reward for being loyal to the US? Nixon’s secret bombing campaign of Laos and Cambodia, and being abandonment when we withdrew, leaving them to be attacked and driven out, refugees in their own land.

    Look how Bush Sr. did the same to the Kurds and the Iraqi resistance in the first Persian Gulf war, calling for them to rise up, and then leaving them o be slaughtered by Saddam’s elite forces Bush left intact Even now the Pentagon and the CIA are at odds with another, each one arming different Syrian rebel factions who are spending more effort fighting each other than Assad. It just goes to shoe it doesn’t pay to be an ally to the US–You will be used up, and left behind.

  2. Useless. The cities will all be toast and anyone unlucky or foolish enough to be caught in them will be ground into the dirt like mud.

    Thr numbers are so overwhelming as to be laughable.

    Just be rural and it will be easy to ride out the Holocaust.

    Distance is thr best and only defense

  3. 1) It’ll be come-as-you-are. Make your friends and contacts with LMI now.

    2) N/A. Any support will have to be indigenous, supplemented by liberal use of siphoning off everything possible from TPTB. Fortunately, the current paradigm has them existing at all by siphoning their sustenance from notional FreeFor areas, so this isn’t nearly the hurdle it appears on paper at first glance.
    Start making those contingency plans now, as well. In depth and detail.

    3) Plan on nothing, and see what develops. We have one neutrally friendly neighbor, and one softly hostile one. If things get sporty, those positions may well harden. That three-ocean protective moat is a double-edged sword.

    4) Like the Sandbox, the amateurs will be winnowed out pretty thoroughly in the opening acts. But every casualty suffered by Team Oppression (whether injured/wounded/killed/desertion) will represent an irreplaceable loss to them that will take months to years to recoup, at a time when they won’t have months to years.
    Even with a draconian draft, expecting a notional Manhattanite or San Franciscan liberal prog to join up and put their asses on the line for anything, and forego Starbucks and video games, will be a fool’s errand.
    Only Washington himself stopped the Whiskey Rebellion; there isn’t anyone of that stature now, and if things get sporty anywhere, TPTB in Washington will have the same chance as was had in the anti-Yeltsin coup in FSU.
    Things will get away from them.

    The problem is, they’ll recognize that reality.

    The local yahoos, OTOH, from the criminal, to the Diversity (but I repeat myself) , to Aloha Snackbar, to pure Deglan opportunists, will take this as the opening bell to begin multi-dimensional turf battles, everyone-v.-everyone, and devil take the hindmost. Expect the brighter ones will cloak their activities in the same rhetoric as FreeFor, “liberty, and just being left alone”, but the latter overwhelmingly to rape, kill, pillage, and burn, in that order, to the extent of the space they can control.

    Plan accordingly, in every way.

    Notable in the linked article was that the SF plan and VDF efforts worked, right up until their own gov, and the outside one(ours), bastardized the thing, until it had gone so pear-shaped it could no longer function for its original purpose. Which opened the floodgates for Tet ’68.

    Not to re-fight the entire SEAsian War games, but had MACV and the SVN govt. not siphoned off VDFs in the first place, but used their own main forces to defend borders and defeat the enemy helpfully found and fixed by VDFs, Tet ’68 would have been impossible, Cronkite and the fifth column in the US couldn’t have thrown in the towel as they did, and the entire country of SVN would have been stabilized, and gone the route of South Korea by 1970 or so without anything but the will to maintain things at the status quo.
    After the utter destruction of the puppet VC in 1968, the war was not (nor really, ever was) a civil one, but a war of conquest and occupation, N vs. S, and would have required vastly less to turn back once there was no place for outsiders to infiltrate through or hide in.

    Learn that lesson too: either you have a place to regroup, individually and collectively, that cannot be dominated by the opposition, or you die on the vine.

  4. SemperFi, 0321

    A fantastic large photo book on this subject is “Special Forces at War” An Illustrated History, Southeast Asia 1957-1975 Shelby L. Stanton.
    Can’t recommend it enough, originally sold for $40, try used book sellers

  5. Who will be the combatants?
    -Marxist Progressives in and out of .gov V. freefor unless there is balkanization by secession and the consequent great migration.

    Who will be the supporting foreign powers?
    -progressives have China, Mexico and the UN
    -freefor has … [cricket noises]

    What areas, if any, will serve as sanctuary areas?
    -There will be NO sanctuary areas… not even Church’s harboring marxist progressives.

    Of what importance, if any, will be the integrity and professionalism of faction leadership? How will those factors impact the conflict overall?
    -once the great unpleasantness kicks off the leaders of freefor will emerge AFTER the first year or so professionalism and successful tactics will be the order of the day.

  6. Alfred E. Neuman

    Reblogged this on FOR GOD AND COUNTRY.

  7. Aesop’s comments pretty well sum up the situation. Two things really stand out to me in this article. Reiterating what Aesop said, the CIDG seemed to work extremely well until the governments got too involved.

    The second point is more directly applicable to us. Notice the size of the units involved. Each SMALL village involved seemed to have a unit that ranged between a very large platoon and company size at least. Translation: If you think that you’re going to get by all by yourself, or with even a just couple of people, you’re sadly mistaken. The number of trainers was small and the implication of the article was that the locals were given just a minimal amount of training in terms of time. It should be pointed out that due to the nature of their lifestyle, they wouldn’t need to be taught land navigation or basic field living, only weapons, basic fire and maneuver, and possibly commo and medical stuff. We have the capability in terms of the small number of trainers, and we have the same amount of time to learn the basics of strong local self defense, if we don’t get distracted. What we don’t have are the numbers of willing, capable locals. Notice that it took about 1 in 5 under arms in the total population to make it successful. Also notice that there was a dedicated reaction force, about 1 out of 10 of the soldiers, and the villages actively supported neighboring villages in case of attack. To us, this means working locally to at least pre vet potential local defense group members and potentially relocating to more friendly areas.