Just keep voting, old-style.
Maybe it will work this time.
Or maybe it’s been working just fine all the time.
Let me check with Mr. Greenwood and get back to you.
Just keep voting, old-style.
Maybe it will work this time.
Or maybe it’s been working just fine all the time.
Let me check with Mr. Greenwood and get back to you.
Don’t forget the Syrians!
A reader sends this University of Chicago Press link:
Copyright notice: Excerpt from pages 166-73 of They Thought They Were Free: The Germans, 1933-45 by Milton Mayer, published by the University of Chicago Press. ©1955, 1966 by the University of Chicago. All rights reserved. This text may be used and shared in accordance with the fair-use provisions of U.S. copyright law, and it may be archived and redistributed in electronic form, provided that this entire notice, including copyright information, is carried and provided that the University of Chicago Press is notified and no fee is charged for access. Archiving, redistribution, or republication of this text on other terms, in any medium, requires the consent of the University of Chicago Press. (Footnotes and other references included in the book may have been removed from this online version of the text.)
But Then It Was Too Late
“What no one seemed to notice,” said a colleague of mine, a philologist, “was the ever widening gap, after 1933, between the government and the people. Just think how very wide this gap was to begin with, here in Germany. And it became always wider. You know, it doesn’t make people close to their government to be told that this is a people’s government, a true democracy, or to be enrolled in civilian defense, or even to vote. All this has little, really nothing, to do with knowing one is governing.
“What happened here was the gradual habituation of the people, little by little, to being governed by surprise; to receiving decisions deliberated in secret; to believing that the situation was so complicated that the government had to act on information which the people could not understand, or so dangerous that, even if the people could not understand it, it could not be released because of national security. And their sense of identification with Hitler, their trust in him, made it easier to widen this gap and reassured those who would otherwise have worried about it.
“This separation of government from people, this widening of the gap, took place so gradually and so insensibly, each step disguised (perhaps not even intentionally) as a temporary emergency measure or associated with true patriotic allegiance or with real social purposes. And all the crises and reforms (real reforms, too) so occupied the people that they did not see the slow motion underneath, of the whole process of government growing remoter and remoter.
“You will understand me when I say that my Middle High German was my life. It was all I cared about. I was a scholar, a specialist. Then, suddenly, I was plunged into all the new activity, as the university was drawn into the new situation; meetings, conferences, interviews, ceremonies, and, above all, papers to be filled out, reports, bibliographies, lists, questionnaires. And on top of that were the demands in the community, the things in which one had to, was ‘expected to’ participate that had not been there or had not been important before. It was all rigmarole, of course, but it consumed all one’s energies, coming on top of the work one really wanted to do. You can see how easy it was, then, not to think about fundamental things. One had no time.”
“Those,” I said, “are the words of my friend the baker. ‘One had no time to think. There was so much going on.’”
“Your friend the baker was right,” said my colleague. “The dictatorship, and the whole process of its coming into being, was above all diverting. It provided an excuse not to think for people who did not want to think anyway. I do not speak of your ‘little men,’ your baker and so on; I speak of my colleagues and myself, learned men, mind you. Most of us did not want to think about fundamental things and never had. There was no need to. Nazism gave us some dreadful, fundamental things to think about—we were decent people—and kept us so busy with continuous changes and ‘crises’ and so fascinated, yes, fascinated, by the machinations of the ‘national enemies,’ without and within, that we had no time to think about these dreadful things that were growing, little by little, all around us. Unconsciously, I suppose, we were grateful. Who wants to think?
“To live in this process is absolutely not to be able to notice it—please try to believe me—unless one has a much greater degree of political awareness, acuity, than most of us had ever had occasion to develop. Each step was so small, so inconsequential, so well explained or, on occasion, ‘regretted,’ that, unless one were detached from the whole process from the beginning, unless one understood what the whole thing was in principle, what all these ‘little measures’ that no ‘patriotic German’ could resent must some day lead to, one no more saw it developing from day to day than a farmer in his field sees the corn growing. One day it is over his head.
“How is this to be avoided, among ordinary men, even highly educated ordinary men? Frankly, I do not know. I do not see, even now. Many, many times since it all happened I have pondered that pair of great maxims, Principiis obsta and Finem respice—‘Resist the beginnings’ and ‘Consider the end.’ But one must foresee the end in order to resist, or even see, the beginnings. One must foresee the end clearly and certainly and how is this to be done, by ordinary men or even by extraordinary men? Things might have. And everyone counts on that might.
“Your ‘little men,’ your Nazi friends, were not against National Socialism in principle. Men like me, who were, are the greater offenders, not because we knew better (that would be too much to say) but because we sensed better. Pastor Niemöller spoke for the thousands and thousands of men like me when he spoke (too modestly of himself) and said that, when the Nazis attacked the Communists, he was a little uneasy, but, after all, he was not a Communist, and so he did nothing; and then they attacked the Socialists, and he was a little uneasier, but, still, he was not a Socialist, and he did nothing; and then the schools, the press, the Jews, and so on, and he was always uneasier, but still he did nothing. And then they attacked the Church, and he was a Churchman, and he did something—but then it was too late.”
“Yes,” I said.
“You see,” my colleague went on, “one doesn’t see exactly where or how to move. Believe me, this is true. Each act, each occasion, is worse than the last, but only a little worse. You wait for the next and the next. You wait for one great shocking occasion, thinking that others, when such a shock comes, will join with you in resisting somehow. You don’t want to act, or even talk, alone; you don’t want to ‘go out of your way to make trouble.’ Why not?—Well, you are not in the habit of doing it. And it is not just fear, fear of standing alone, that restrains you; it is also genuine uncertainty.
“Uncertainty is a very important factor, and, instead of decreasing as time goes on, it grows. Outside, in the streets, in the general community, ‘everyone’ is happy. One hears no protest, and certainly sees none. You know, in France or Italy there would be slogans against the government painted on walls and fences; in Germany, outside the great cities, perhaps, there is not even this. In the university community, in your own community, you speak privately to your colleagues, some of whom certainly feel as you do; but what do they say? They say, ‘It’s not so bad’ or ‘You’re seeing things’ or ‘You’re an alarmist.’
“And you are an alarmist. You are saying that this must lead to this, and you can’t prove it. These are the beginnings, yes; but how do you know for sure when you don’t know the end, and how do you know, or even surmise, the end? On the one hand, your enemies, the law, the regime, the Party, intimidate you. On the other, your colleagues pooh-pooh you as pessimistic or even neurotic. You are left with your close friends, who are, naturally, people who have always thought as you have.
“But your friends are fewer now. Some have drifted off somewhere or submerged themselves in their work. You no longer see as many as you did at meetings or gatherings. Informal groups become smaller; attendance drops off in little organizations, and the organizations themselves wither. Now, in small gatherings of your oldest friends, you feel that you are talking to yourselves, that you are isolated from the reality of things. This weakens your confidence still further and serves as a further deterrent to—to what? It is clearer all the time that, if you are going to do anything, you must make an occasion to do it, and then you are obviously a troublemaker. So you wait, and you wait.
“But the one great shocking occasion, when tens or hundreds or thousands will join with you, never comes. That’s the difficulty. If the last and worst act of the whole regime had come immediately after the first and smallest, thousands, yes, millions would have been sufficiently shocked—if, let us say, the gassing of the Jews in ’43 had come immediately after the ‘German Firm’ stickers on the windows of non-Jewish shops in ’33. But of course this isn’t the way it happens. In between come all the hundreds of little steps, some of them imperceptible, each of them preparing you not to be shocked by the next. Step C is not so much worse than Step B, and, if you did not make a stand at Step B, why should you at Step C? And so on to Step D.
“And one day, too late, your principles, if you were ever sensible of them, all rush in upon you. The burden of self-deception has grown too heavy, and some minor incident, in my case my little boy, hardly more than a baby, saying ‘Jewish swine,’ collapses it all at once, and you see that everything, everything, has changed and changed completely under your nose. The world you live in—your nation, your people—is not the world you were born in at all. The forms are all there, all untouched, all reassuring, the houses, the shops, the jobs, the mealtimes, the visits, the concerts, the cinema, the holidays. But the spirit, which you never noticed because you made the lifelong mistake of identifying it with the forms, is changed. Now you live in a world of hate and fear, and the people who hate and fear do not even know it themselves; when everyone is transformed, no one is transformed. Now you live in a system which rules without responsibility even to God. The system itself could not have intended this in the beginning, but in order to sustain itself it was compelled to go all the way.
“You have gone almost all the way yourself. Life is a continuing process, a flow, not a succession of acts and events at all. It has flowed to a new level, carrying you with it, without any effort on your part. On this new level you live, you have been living more comfortably every day, with new morals, new principles. You have accepted things you would not have accepted five years ago, a year ago, things that your father, even in Germany, could not have imagined.
“Suddenly it all comes down, all at once. You see what you are, what you have done, or, more accurately, what you haven’t done (for that was all that was required of most of us: that we do nothing). You remember those early meetings of your department in the university when, if one had stood, others would have stood, perhaps, but no one stood. A small matter, a matter of hiring this man or that, and you hired this one rather than that. You remember everything now, and your heart breaks. Too late. You are compromised beyond repair.
“What then? You must then shoot yourself. A few did. Or ‘adjust’ your principles. Many tried, and some, I suppose, succeeded; not I, however. Or learn to live the rest of your life with your shame. This last is the nearest there is, under the circumstances, to heroism: shame. Many Germans became this poor kind of hero, many more, I think, than the world knows or cares to know.”
I said nothing. I thought of nothing to say.
“I can tell you,” my colleague went on, “of a man in Leipzig, a judge. He was not a Nazi, except nominally, but he certainly wasn’t an anti-Nazi. He was just—a judge. In ’42 or ’43, early ’43, I think it was, a Jew was tried before him in a case involving, but only incidentally, relations with an ‘Aryan’ woman. This was ‘race injury,’ something the Party was especially anxious to punish. In the case at bar, however, the judge had the power to convict the man of a ‘nonracial’ offense and send him to an ordinary prison for a very long term, thus saving him from Party ‘processing’ which would have meant concentration camp or, more probably, deportation and death. But the man was innocent of the ‘nonracial’ charge, in the judge’s opinion, and so, as an honorable judge, he acquitted him. Of course, the Party seized the Jew as soon as he left the courtroom.”
“And the judge?”
“Yes, the judge. He could not get the case off his conscience—a case, mind you, in which he had acquitted an innocent man. He thought that he should have convicted him and saved him from the Party, but how could he have convicted an innocent man? The thing preyed on him more and more, and he had to talk about it, first to his family, then to his friends, and then to acquaintances. (That’s how I heard about it.) After the ’44 Putsch they arrested him. After that, I don’t know.”
I said nothing.
“Once the war began,” my colleague continued, “resistance, protest, criticism, complaint, all carried with them a multiplied likelihood of the greatest punishment. Mere lack of enthusiasm, or failure to show it in public, was ‘defeatism.’ You assumed that there were lists of those who would be ‘dealt with’ later, after the victory. Goebbels was very clever here, too. He continually promised a ‘victory orgy’ to ‘take care of’ those who thought that their ‘treasonable attitude’ had escaped notice. And he meant it; that was not just propaganda. And that was enough to put an end to all uncertainty.
“Once the war began, the government could do anything ‘necessary’ to win it; so it was with the ‘final solution of the Jewish problem,’ which the Nazis always talked about but never dared undertake, not even the Nazis, until war and its ‘necessities’ gave them the knowledge that they could get away with it. The people abroad who thought that war against Hitler would help the Jews were wrong. And the people in Germany who, once the war had begun, still thought of complaining, protesting, resisting, were betting on Germany’s losing the war. It was a long bet. Not many made it.”
Stellvertretender Reichskommissar für Kultur und öffentliche Onanie Greenwood could not be reached for comment.
From SFC Barry:
Playing At Soldier
III is a Crowd
SFC Steven M Barry USA RET
When your administrator, “concernedamerican,” wrote to this writer asking for an illustration for the Hope is in the Past Reading List that missed movement, Barry responded (along with the illustration) that comments were starting to exhaust themselves and was he ready to move on to Part II. Your administrator gently urged that the comments had seemingly overlooked something that had riveted your administrator’s attention. Due credit to your administrator; it was in fact the “punch line” of Part I and the planned beginning point of Part II.
But then arose a controversy causing a scathing rebuke from your administrator; a rebuke the subject about what and which parties Barry was ignorant. So Barry asked about it. Your administrator explained it was about training. After a brief correspondence about training this writer offered his observations on that subject for this list. Your administrator said (paraphrasing), “Do it.”
Please reserve any vituperation, insolent questions, and stone-throwing about what follows to this writer and this writer alone. But at least read all the words first.
When the expressed intent of learning the much less than minimal martial skills of the infantry private (id est, shoot, move) – which overwhelmingly is what most private military training boils down to, and no matter how sophisticated it is advertised to be it never gets any better – is confined to defense of family and neighborhood against riotous primitive minorities (we all know who they are) and roaming bandit gangs after a natural disaster of not-SHTF proportions, or both, said training is both sane and sober and ought be encouraged.
And because that intention is sane it can be put to rest here – excepting a few observations. You will learn just as much about being an infantry private with much less than minimal training over a long weekend from somebody who was a fire team or squad leader in 82ABN or 10MTN as you will from somebody who was Ranger or SF. Basic infantry private skills are basic infantry private skills. It doesn’t matter from whom you learn them (provided they know what they are doing) or how much you paid for it. Never mind that you could have joined the Army as an infantryman and have learned those skills (and maybe more) for nothing. Another thing: The last things you need to know for home and neighborhood defense are patrolling, etc.. The rioters and bandits will find you with no wasted or incompetent or provocative effort on your part. One last thing: Don’t even dream that going to a three or four day combat handgun course or a combat rifle course is going to turn you into a gunfighter. It won’t.
But if the expressed (or implied) intent of learning the much less than minimal martial skills of an infantry private crosses the threshold of sanity into the schizophrenic ideological terrain of “resisting oppressive tyranny” (really? you keep voting), “restoring the Constitution” (why? it is working perfectly), “defending our freedoms” (which ‘freedoms’ got us into the place we are at now), and – most insane of all – “the Militia will rise up and (insert your favorite slogan),” the said purpose for such training is delusional. It is madness. It is suicidal. Dangerously stupid would be an improvement. Because such an intention is not only based upon lies and fairy tales. It is a totally subjective divorce from an objective reality.
THE MILITIA MYTH
Whatever one knows about the rebel militia during the American Revolution is simply not true. We can easily dismiss – for now — the sordid details of the affair of Lexington and Concord and get straight to the principle. What is militia? The word militia is the Latin “militia,” meaning, military service. Said service performed by a “miles,” meaning, a soldier. Getting close to the American Revolution, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Revised 6th Ed (1856) gives us, “The military force of the nation, consisting of citizens called forth to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection and repel invasion.” And then back to immediately post American Revolution second amendment, “A well regulated Militia….”
Note the qualifying word, “regulated.” Again, a Latin verb, “regulare,” meaning, “To adjust by rule, method, or established mode; to direct by rule or restriction; to subject to governing principles or laws.” The “…governing principle or laws” regarding Militia spanning the time from the American Revolution to just pre-Civil War are fairly laid out by Bouvier (1856) in case citations dating back to the Militia Act of 1792, just a few years after ratification of the Ten Amendments. And note this well: in all case citations, the “governing principles or laws” issuing from Congress trump State “principles or laws.” Here is the 1856 legal description of Militia:
“The Constitution of the United States provides on this subject as follows: Art. 1, s. 8, 14. Congress shall have power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.
3.-15. to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia, according to the discipline prescribed by congress.”
There follows in Bouvier much legal hairsplitting about refusal of service and missing movement; apparently the major problems at the time. But, note: “Congress shall have power to….” What do the states get? They get to appoint officers and authority of training – “…according to the discipline prescribed by congress.” In other words, the states get nothing except some political appointments and “authority of training” according to and in conformity with Congressional regulation.
Now, dear reader, go back in time to the just pre-American Revolution colonies. Substitute the word “King” for “Congress,” and “Kingdom” for “Union,” and “Colony” for “State,” and you have the pre-Revolution militia in full agreement with post-Revolution Constitutional militia described by Bouvier. An agreement that contradicts modern ideas about the thing.
Consider: Who authorized the Colonial militia? The King. Who organized and trained the Colonial militia? The King’s officers and NCOs. Who appointed the officers of the Colonial militia? The Lord Governor of the colony — who was appointed by the King. Under what regulations did they drill? Under the King’s military regulations (i.e. manuals). Who armed the Colonial militia? They were armed from the Crown’s arsenal – which, by the way, is why the cannon (crew served weapons) and small arms of the Colonial militia bore the stamp “GR” (George Rex); those weapons belonged to the Crown. Did the Crown ever care about personal weapons? No; why would they? There was never even a question about them because they had nothing to do with the militia. And all of that existed under the “oppressive tyranny” of Colonial governance by the Lord Governors appointed by His Royal Highness, George III — meaning, without any ink smeared foolscap contrivance called Constitution.
What then can be said about the Colonial militia on Lexington Common on 19 April 1775? To get a grip on the matter it must be understood that the British subjects in the Colonial militia were an auxiliary armed force of the British Army and thus “regulated” under Royal authority. So what can be said about their actions on that day? First, having mustered without authority they can be called disobedient. Second, having mustered in opposition to the British Army (and therefore against the Lord Governor, their commander) they can be called disloyal. Third, having defied the order to lay down and deliver their government issued weapons they can be called mutineers. And fourth, having fired upon the soldiers of their King they can be called nothing but traitors. “You damned rebels” were the exactly true words spoken by the commander of the British Army column under orders to recover Crown armaments from revolutionaries, anarchists and disturbers of order who are today called, hypocritically, “patriots.”
IT GETS WORSE
The battle record of the American militia, Crown, rebel, or Constitutional is nothing to uphold as anything even remotely resembling martial competence – hardly surprising given they were ruggedly individual civilians. At Bunker Hill the militia died. During the Rebellion the revolutionary militia served the more or less useful purpose as “speed-bumps” and bullet-stoppers before the Continental Line engaged, more often than not badly. The Constitutional militia were useful for eliminating the poorly organized and equally ruggedly individual whiskey distilling competition to George Washington’s own distilleries (even though Washington complained bitterly about their “martial” qualities), and for putting down those who were equally ill trained and undisciplined and who actually took the Articles of Confederation seriously (i.e. Shay’s Rebellion). Really, if the Rebel militia were so great there would have been no need for the Continental Line – or, later, after the embarrassment of the Constitutional militia, a military academy. By contrast, the Tory militia actually did quite well in their assigned tasks – being under authority and discipline and led by Regulars. (!)
In 1812 the militia was a disaster and simply melted away before the British Line. Many States refused to commit their militia because they were not under attack (that is this writer’s favorite part). The militia was simply ignored during the Mexican American War; Volunteer regiments were raised instead. The militia was worse than useless during the Snivel War. Within a year the Confederates gave up on that nonsense and folded them into the Army (partisans excepting) and started a draft. The Union had to give up on them entirely and (again) form Volunteer regiments (often led by Communist refugee exiles from the 1848 Communist revolution in Europe – who tucked in easily to the United States and admired it greatly, as did their apostle Karl Marx). After the Snivel War there is nothing about the Constitutional militia worthy of comment until the Spanish American War. The sad performance of the Constitutional militia therein was such that sober consideration resulted in the 1903 Dick Act (many times amended) which repealed the 1792 Militia Act and essentially kicked the Constitutional militia into the gutter in favor of a Federal reserve army called the National Guard.
THE “UNORGANIZED” THING
Fantasies about some thing called “unorganized militia” was a big deal during the 1990s. And some, perhaps out of nostalgia, attempt the same propaganda today. But, for all their hubris during those heady years of the ’90s, had “patriots” bothered to actually read the law they would have found that even in the 1792 Militia Act:
“The militia belong to the states respectively, and are subject, both in their civil and military capacities, to the jurisdiction and laws of the state, except so far as these laws are controlled by acts of congress, constitutionally made.” (Bouvier, “Militia,” 5.-2.)
Well, the 1903 Dick Act was “constitutionally made,” and it is “controlled by acts of congress,” and those controls and acts do talk about the unorganized thing. In the most recent “constitutionally made… acts of congress:”
“USC Title 10 (Armed forces), section 311 (Militia: Composition and Classes), paragraph (a) states: ‘The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under 45 years of age….’ Paragraph (b) further states, ‘The classes of the militia are: (1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia; and (2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia.'”
In plain English, if you are a male, age 17 to 45, you are either in the National Guard and under authority and discipline, or you are not and you are unorganized civilian draft fodder. Excepting the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), who are subject to recall and are the “unorganized militia” de jure. But if you are civilian draft fodder and attempt organizing an amateur rifle squad that answers to no authority (probably not even to yours – if by rashness and shameless insolence you can somehow claim any) do not be astonished when your “Constitutional unorganized militia” is snuffed out by Constitutional authority, rightly, according to its own logic, in objection to your private “army.”
There was some considerable garment rending about the essay “Hope is in the Past,” (Part I), telling you that the only way out of SHTF is early Feudalism. This writer stated (truthfully) that he who has an army will rule. During the Feudal Age, “private” armies were the norm. The King had one. Every Duke had one. They were how rights were defended or asserted. The soldiers of those private armies were in fact a class. And “the people” minded their place.
But consider this, gentle reader: No constitutional government – any place at any time since the “Reformation” ushered in the modern nation states with their highly centralized governments and national armies — has ever tolerated private armies. Even under the 1792 Militia Act, if some hotshot from the local Lodge wanted to raise an infantry company he had to apply to the Governor of the State and agree to pay for it out of his own pocket. He was commissioned by the Governor, and therefore a subordinate under authority. In other words, there was a chain of command.
In the modern constitutional states there have been only two types of private armies. Those that have been snuffed out, and those that will be snuffed out.
All well and good, Barry. What is your solution?
Let’s be brutally honest. In the extreme best case scenario there will be, in whatever “redoubt” phantasm, about a dozen “like minded individuals” whom have reasonably similar minimal infantry private training living within about a fifty or hundred mile radius. What do you have? About a dozen infantry privates scattered all over the map. In some places there may be somewhat better distribution, in other places worse. What if something of not-SHTF proportion happens; say the announcement of the most dreaded martial law? You still have a dozen “like minded individual” infantry privates scattered all over the map. What now?
Objection: “We will rendezvous.” Answer: If everybody makes it through all the checkpoints and flying roadblocks make sure there is adequate parking. Assuming adequate parking, what then? Who is in charge? (!) What is the chain of command? Logistics? How will discipline be enforced? What is the plan? (“Resist oppressive tyranny” is not a plan.) Such questions only multiply. And it is a certainty the opposition will not be so troubled by such uncertainties.
Enough of obvious problems. Here is the solution for what you have available to you. It is the Old SF solution. The principle will remain the same no matter how many folks you can get together. To put it in perspective, an Old SF DetA of twelve was the nucleus of an infantry battalion which they could build from scratch. By first training the staff. Everything follows downward from there.
In your case of exclusive minor subunits we can invert the order of work.
Assuming you can somehow collect three of you together you now have the nucleus of a rifle squad; a squad leader and two fire team leaders. Quit running around the woods playing at soldier and gather what you can on what a squad is, how it works, and tactics. Study it. There are plenty of manuals around. The older the better. Read them. You do not need Joes. You need the cadre and they need to know what they are about.
Assuming you can get four people together you now have the nucleus of a rifle platoon; PL, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd squad leaders. Gather everything you can on what a platoon is, how it works, and tactics. Study it. There are plenty of manuals around. The older the better. Read them. Study them. You do not need Joes. You need the cadre and they need to know what they are about.
Expansion is simple. In the case of the squad cadre it is no hard matter for a fire team leader to train up three or four riflemen. Cut out all the frills and in a long weekend you have a rifle squad with a cadre who knows how to use it. A week of intensive training as a squad in attack and defense and you’ll have something. After your first firefight you’ll have only half your people, but they’ll be veterans.
In the case of a platoon cadre the PL oversees the squad leaders training their fire team leaders. Cut out the frills, week one. Fire team leaders train up their riflemen as in the paragraph above – mid-week two. 1st squad leader peels off his best fire team leader and trains him as squad leader, who peels off his best rifleman and trains him as fire team leader. 1st squad leader becomes Platoon Sergeant. Cut out the frills and in three weeks you have a platoon with a cadre who knows how to use it. Two more weeks of no frills intensive platoon offense and defense and you’ll have something.
And that is how we used to do it in the real world at the lowest subunit level. If you can expand a cadre into a squad you might have your block covered. If you can expand a cadre into a platoon you’ll be sorely pressed to defend your neighborhood. Get it?
When you get to company and battalion level you are talking about honest to God staff work and that is beyond the scope of this essay. As mentioned at the beginning of this heading building a battalion begins with a battalion staff cadre and is a top down procedure.
A FINAL WORD
There have been recent rumblings among the “III crowd” about insurrection. Invariably it is fronted as a bottom up thing. That is a lie. There never has been any such thing as a successful insurrection (or revolution) from below. Ever. No where. It is a top down thing. Insurrection (or revolution) is planned in a rarefied atmosphere. People playing at soldier are not part of that planning. They are just one of the tools.
Who have and will again do more of the same.
Doubters need to read this essential account of the day and the aftermath.
As ye deal, so shall ye be dealt.
EVERY DAY THAT WE’RE NOT AT WAR IS ANOTHER DAY WE GET TO SHARPEN OUR HATCHETS.
Sam K. asks some fair questions in comments and related email (condensed below for clarity) about this upcoming FTX:
A few questions:
What is the Commander’s Intent regarding this exercise?
How does this exercise telegraph anything meaningful to OpFor regarding capabilities, without revealing said capabilities, thus giving OpFor an angle of attack on each participating group?
Who is coordinating?hosting/overseeing? Too many demonstrably untrustworthy people playing in these waters to be part of a blind, multi-faceted, national/regional game when the stakes are so high.
How does telegraphing capabilities (which I sadly suspect will be an applied organizational clusterfoxtrot, given the levels of coordination and teamwork personally witnessed between groups spread geographically) advantage FreeFor if Intent remains undemonstrated? (Most individual teams do not have this stuff nailed-down, asking for a public display that incorporates coordination is to beg for public embarrassment, methinks.) Ten million ARs in private hands are useless if 9.999 million remain in gun safes instead of at the Green.
What is the final, coordinated act among all participants that is the equivalent of stacking Barry-cades at the gates of the White House?
April 19 is a big deal. MSM and all OpFor will be all over us with their messaging, and they WILL make inroads to this year’s new crop of civilian fucktards – reminding them/educating them that we patriots are all American ISIS.
We need to get people off the couch – something we all recognize. Couch potatoes will never move far or do too much work on their first Op – so we should keep our requests of them within their wheelhouse.
My suggestion for a 19 April ESAD Op (and we make it public as hell – let those fuckers know we are coming and let them sweat it) – on April 19 we have Patriots from all over America send WRSA (or some other clearing house) images of LEO shops or City Halls from their respective AOs. No captions needed, no threats, no confrontations – we just end the day with every picture we can have Patriots send in of their local OpFor HQ.
I think I understand many of the unspoken goals (practical and propaganda), and I’ll refrain from further questions until these are clarified a bit.
1) Commander’s Intent: To deploy FREEFOR elements within their spheres of experience/interests/skillsets, to collect information for local analysis/action, and to exercise redundant methods of communication regarding results.
2) Command: Planning stage under direction of WINTER MUSTER participants, with open-source input as received. FTX command will be under local control of participants, with communications network command/operations pursuant to plan (TBD).
3) NOTE: NO ONE HAS TO DO ANYTHING AT ALL. IF SOMEONE CHOOSES TO PARTICIPATE, THE NATURE, SCOPE, AND DURATION OF THAT PARTICIPATION IS ENTIRELY WITHIN THEIR OWN CONTROL – BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE FTX. THERE WILL BE MEANINGFUL BENEFIT FOR PARTICIPANTS WHO, FOR EXAMPLE, SIMPLY NOTE THE LOCATIONS OF ALL LOCAL POLITICIANS FOR FUTURE REFERENCE IN THAT AO, WITH ZERO COMMUNICATION OF THOSE RESULTS TO ANYONE OUTSIDE OF THAT AO.
4) Participation can also come in the form of establishing a field monitoring station on non-grid power and monitoring FTX frequencies.
5) Consider participation via use of non-Internet/non-RF comms, such as dead-drops and other fundamental fieldcraft methods.
6) 240 years ago on 19 April, British subjects stepped forth in their towns against tyranny. NPFD 2015/1 is designed to pay homage to those brave men by providing a context in which modern-day Americans can step forth – legally and respectfully, at least towards objects worthy of respect – and demonstrate that they too will stand against tyranny and the dictates of man.
No matter what.
Dash di-di-dit dash dash di-dit
There is no voting our way out of this mess.
So just keep voting.
That would be really bad.
This is the 12 minute introduction to Partisan Radio. These will be 20 to 30 minute podcasts designed to provide information, procedures, and training related to disaster, prepper, patriot communications in a grid-up or grid-down environment. Much more to come!
– Scanners, features, and recommended models
– Intelligence (Locating forms and reporting to NCS)
– Real World – Hurricane Katrina 911 Call using Ham Radio
And yes, it does look familiar…
The word is “homage“.
In an essential industry.
What a surprise.
Money quote from Belmont Club: Losing The Internet:
Will the administration give you a “freer and more open Internet” than you have now? Or more to the point, will giving it over to the feds enhance security? We are in all probability doomed by this move. The difference is we know it. The administration has not yet figured out that in incompetent hands even the finest weapon can be turned around to face its hapless wielder.
Boy, will they be surprised.
Read the whole thing.
Got hard copy?